



19<sup>th</sup> September, 2024

# Unlock the power of your data: Enhance safety, reliability and productivity

Data is one of the biggest assets in our organisations, and yet, 73% remains underutilised.



# About Empirisys

Founded by Gus Carroll and Pete Sueref in October 2020

We uncover vital intelligence within your existing data.

This hidden data can be refined into unique insights, and then transformed into practical solutions to improve safety, reduce losses and build resilience.

All our AI and machine learning models are based on academic principles and are transparent and trustworthy.

Our technology aims to enhance human endeavour and expertise rather than replace it.

  
**THE SUNDAY TIMES**  
**T Best Places  
to Work 2023**



**Data Scientists**




**Process Safety  
Experts**



**Software  
Developers**

# The Inspiration Behind Our Mission





**Dr Nyala Noe**  
Chief Data Scientist

Through her background in social psychology and computer science, Nyala has developed a particular interest in using networks to make sense of complex data. After completing her PhD at Cardiff University, Nyala started her career as a data scientist and eventually joined Empirisys as one of its founding employees.



**Gwilym Rees**  
Data Scientist

Gwilym holds a BSc in Natural Sciences from Exeter University and began his career in an unexpected field – spending two years as a professional chef before transitioning into data science. He later attained a PgDip in Applied Data and AI at the University of South Wales. Gwilym is passionate about leveraging machine learning and data visualization to drive advancements within the process safety sector.



**Roger Berriman**  
Technical Manager

Roger has a background in Process Safety with over 20 years' experience in operations and high hazard safety management in the chemicals, refining and oil & gas sectors. Roger is a registered Professional Process Safety Engineer, a chartered Chemical Engineer and a member of IChemE.

# Agenda

| Time                    | Presentation Title/ themes                                                                       |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 14:00 GMT<br>15:00 CEST | The Data Science Process<br>Dr Nyala Noe  Chief Data Scientist                                   |
| 14:10 GMT<br>15:10 CEST | Case Study: Enhancing Reliability of an Existing Key Asset<br>Dr Nyala Noe  Chief Data Scientist |
| 14:25 GMT<br>15:25 CEST | Connecting weak signals and proactively boosting MAH prevention<br>Gwilym Rees   Data Scientist  |
| 14:40 GMT<br>15:40 CEST | Leadership Training<br>Roger Berriman   Technical Manager                                        |
| 14:55 GMT<br>15:55 CEST | Opportunity for questions (Q&A)                                                                  |



Presented by: Nyala Noe

# The Data Science Process

Transform your biggest asset into your competitive advantage





# Why data science?

Understand your existing data


“What can my data tell me that I didn’t know about before?”

Follow-through on a specific hypothesis


“Are the trends I am seeing in increased observations around a specific topic genuine?”

Make connections you haven’t seen before

“Are trends in maintenance related to process safety events, and if so, how?”



- **Test** models and outputs thoroughly
- Write **production-ready** code
- **Engage** with wider teams and/or end users




- **Discovery** phase
- **Understand** client needs
- Formulate clear **expectations** on delivery



- Agree on data ingestion **strategy**
- Data can come in many **different formats**
- **Understand** data through dictionaries and SMEs


- **Assess model performance**
- Report on your **findings**
- **Present and discuss your** outputs



- **Choose model appropriate to hypothesis and data**
- **Visualise** outputs and interpret them



- **Quality control:** availability, completeness, accuracy
- Separate datasets to **join together**
- **Formatting** data



# Our Typical Data Science Approach



## 1. In-Depth QCA Assessment

Quality, Completeness, and Availability check of all selected datasets based on pre-determined acceptance criteria. This also includes a review of tools and environments

## 2. QCA Stage Gate

Collaborative agreement on whether to proceed or not

## 3. Exploratory Data Analysis

Explore selected data, cleanse, transform, and join to create single data lake

Agree meaningful set of hypotheses and explore potential insights

## 4. Deep Dive

Focus on one (or more) high value outcomes from exploratory stage






Develop useful and usable output for client (often an interactive dashboard)

## 5. Outcome Review

Based on results of Step 4, determine next steps, such as building out the model on new data, etc

# Example Outputs

**Detect: Performance Influencing Factors** – Our Industry tested AI algorithm helps organisations input their data sets to identify performance influencing factors which are often the root cause of safety events. Our dashboard visualisations then help to pinpoint targeted interventions to enhance safety, reliability, and productivity.




| Action                          | Organisational Level | Timeframe   | Expected Impact |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------|-----------------|
| Tailor content to your audience | Asset                | Immediate   | High            |
| Give engaging delivery          | Region               | Short-term  | Medium          |
| Clear and memorable takeaways   | bp-wide              | Medium-term | Low             |
| Give engaging delivery          | Region               | Long-term   | Medium          |



Presented by: Nyala Noë

# Case Study: Enhancing Reliability of an Existing Key Asset

Using data science and process safety leadership training



# Challenges to address

**Challenge:** the management team overseeing the asset performs continuous improvement to:


- Safety
- Health and Environment
- Reliability
- Production

In addition to the existing and well-established approaches to successfully manage these areas, can the latest innovations in data science also be applied to yield even greater outcomes?

# Asset reliability improvements evident in post-intervention

1

Setup multi-disciplinary team of data scientists, subject-matter experts, and engineers



Number of unplanned outages reduced by over half

2

Data evidence to pinpoint areas for improvement



Improvements in several key systems

3

Targeted plan to address identified areas



Engagement of the whole operating team, setting them up for success

# A partnership for success

Our client's asset management has:

- extensive experience
- a strong and diverse workforce
- wide range of accumulated operating data

Could Data Science enhance their operating decisions?

Empirisys' belief that changing culture is fundamental to creating the conditions that enable safer, better performing, and more sustainable businesses to evolve.

These goals can be achieved with a more data driven approach which we champion.

# Working as one team

- **Project Leader (FT)**: Ensure the smooth running of the project and connecting the right people
- **Data Scientists (FT)**: gather, prepare, and analyse data
- **SCRUM Master (PT)**: facilitate the team working together
- **Subject-Matter Experts (PT)**: Interpret, validate, and review results
- **Senior Managers (PT)**: Validate results and action them

# Empirisys Team



**Andrew  
Gibson**

Subject-Matter  
Expert, chartered  
engineer



**Darren  
Oliver**

Subject-Matter  
Expert, safety  
leadership



**Gus  
Carroll**

Subject-Matter  
Expert, CEO



**Dr Nyala  
Noë**

Data Science, CDO

# Approach

1. Set objective: set what problem needs to be addressed

*Example: Understand the effect of operator experience on asset reliability*

2. Gather data: gather any data relevant to the objective

*Example: reliability and training/competence data of asset personnel*

3. Analyse evidence: analyse the gathered data for patterns and anomalies

*Example: trends in experience levels over time*

4. Gain insight: root cause analysis of trend

*Example: small but consistent experience drift over time*

5. Derive action: use data evidence to derive a meaningful solution

*Example: focused effort on coaching*



# Working as one team to respond to the challenge

1

Weekly stand-ups to share progress and change direction if needed

2

Iterative analysis that could react quickly to new questions as they emerged

3

Regular reviews with Subject-Matter Experts to make sure data insights make sense



# Combining different datasets for a complete picture



What is the history of the asset and how did that influence its current state?

Historic data

- Trends
- Anomalies
- Forecasting

Gained understanding of the current trends at the asset



What is the current state of the asset and its people?

Operational data

- Plant
- Process
- People

Identified issues around processes, loss of experience, and where work was focused



How do the people feel about their asset and its current state?

- Areas of strength
- Areas of opportunity
- Emotions

Identified issues around culture and psychological safety at the asset


# Actioning the findings

**Details on Intervention:** rationalize operator surveillance processes.


**Approach:** SME team reviewed the value of the current list of procedures.

**Result:** one third of procedures removed, allowing more time for other activities.

### Reduction in the Number of Procedures Completed



### Increased Procedure Duration Maintained




# Actioning the findings

**Details on Intervention:** improve culture at the asset through coaching intervention

**Approach:** Empirisys provided leadership coaching to the management team

**Result:** shift in culture at the asset which is reflected in an improved performance



# Winning Factors

- Strong support from asset manager
- Team collaboration and transparency
- Efficient and wide-ranging data access
- Data science platform that enabled quick analysis
- Frequent touchpoints with relevant subject-matter experts
- Intervention to directly address the outcomes of the analysis

Seamless collaboration and implementing actions informed by data evidence ensured success



# Poll Question

What do you believe is the most significant hurdle to enhancing asset reliability?


- a. Insufficient proactive maintenance and inspection programs
- b. Difficulty implementing real-time monitoring technologies
- c. Challenges in ensuring data quality for decision-making
- d. Gaps in training and competency of operational staff
- e. Other- Please specify in the chat



Presented by: Gwilym Rees

# Enhanced Hardware Barrier Model

Addressing major accident hazards effectively



# Summary

**Objective:** Create useful insight from existing operational data to support decision making to manage risk

## Phase 1

- Mapped performance standards (SECEs) to MAHs using the AOC safety case

## Phase 2 – Proof of Concept

- Mapped equipment to a subset of the above SECEs and MAHs
- Established risk criteria for each PSPI
- Power BI dashboard






# Introduction

The Underlying Concept & Current Situation

# The Underlying Concept



- Management of process safety requires understanding of the status of:
  - People
  - Process
  - Plant
- Understand vulnerabilities to people via AOC's competence management processes
- Proxy indicators (existing PSPIs) are used to measure the integrity and vulnerability of:
  - Hardware barriers and the Performance Standards (SECEs)<sup>1</sup> used to manage them
  - Major Accident Hazards and their related QRA events<sup>2</sup>


<sup>1</sup> A set of assurance tasks which comprise part of a barrier

<sup>2</sup> Scenarios which can lead to the MAH, identified via the quantitative risk assessment (QRA)

# Current Situation

- AOC monitors PSPIs
- However, current PSPI monitoring is at a very aggregated level
- We want to build onto existing approach to create much more granularity and insight


| GOOD – NO ISSUES                                     | PREVENTION           |                     | DETECTION, CONTROL & RECOVERY |                   |                  |                    |                    |             |
|------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------|
|                                                      | GOOD – MINOR ISSUES  | GOOD – MAJOR ISSUES | Ignition Control              | Detection Systems | Shutdown Systems | Protection Systems | Emergency Response | Life Saving |
| DEGRADED – EFFECTIVE                                 | Structural Integrity | Process Containment |                               |                   |                  |                    |                    |             |
| IMPAIRED                                             |                      |                     |                               |                   |                  |                    |                    |             |
| Number of ORAs                                       |                      |                     |                               |                   |                  |                    |                    |             |
| Number of ORAs in place for over 6 months            |                      |                     |                               |                   |                  |                    |                    |             |
| PMA Deferrals (deferred safety critical maintenance) |                      |                     |                               |                   |                  |                    |                    |             |
| PMA Backlog (overdue safety critical maintenance)    |                      |                     |                               |                   |                  |                    |                    |             |
| CMA and P1 CM Backlog                                |                      |                     |                               |                   |                  |                    |                    |             |
| All CM backlog                                       |                      |                     |                               |                   |                  |                    |                    |             |
| Hydrocarbon Leaks and seeps                          |                      |                     |                               |                   |                  |                    |                    |             |
| Anomalies - high risk (unmitigated)                  |                      |                     |                               |                   |                  |                    |                    |             |
| Anomalies - medium risk (unmitigated)                |                      |                     |                               |                   |                  |                    |                    |             |
| Hydrocarbon Temporary Repairs                        |                      |                     |                               |                   |                  |                    |                    |             |
| Firewater temporary repairs                          |                      |                     |                               |                   |                  |                    |                    |             |
| Open Level 2 & 3 RARs (verification)                 |                      |                     |                               |                   |                  |                    |                    |             |
| Number of live MOCs                                  |                      |                     |                               |                   |                  |                    |                    |             |
| Long Term Inhibits                                   |                      |                     |                               |                   |                  |                    |                    |             |



# Current Situation

- AOC monitors PSPIs
- However, current PSPI monitoring is at a very aggregated level
- We want to build onto existing approach to create much more granularity and insight

| GOOD – NO ISSUES                                     | PREVENTION           |                     | DETECTION, CONTROL & RECOVERY |                   |                  |                    |                    |             |
|------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------|
|                                                      | GOOD – MINOR ISSUES  | GOOD – MAJOR ISSUES | Ignition Control              | Detection Systems | Shutdown Systems | Protection Systems | Emergency Response | Life Saving |
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| Hydrocarbon Temporary Repairs                        |                      |                     |                               |                   |                  |                    |                    |             |
| Firewater temporary repairs                          |                      |                     |                               |                   |                  |                    |                    |             |
| Open Level 2 & 3 RARs (verification)                 |                      |                     |                               |                   |                  |                    |                    |             |
| Number of live MOCs                                  |                      |                     |                               |                   |                  |                    |                    |             |
| Long Term Inhibits                                   |                      |                     |                               |                   |                  |                    |                    |             |





# PoC Barrier Model

Deliverables and Scope

# PoC Deliverables

The PoC Barrier Model project was split into 5 primary deliverables

## 1. Equipment Mapping

Map equipment to SECEs and QRA Events

## 2. Data Quality Analysis

Verify the quality, completeness, and availability of PSPI data sources

## 3. Risk Criteria

Establish 'RAG' risk criteria for each PSPI

## 4. Data Model

Build a scalable, efficient data model


## 5. Data Visualization

Visualise insights from the barrier model in a Power BI dashboard

Start: Apr 2024

End: May 2024

# PoC Scope: Barriers & SECEs



- “Dynamic” SECEs are those which are likely to fluctuate on a frequent e.g. daily basis
- “Static” SECEs can be integrated in a future iteration
- Equipment to SECE mapping obtained from maintenance data source

# PoC Scope: MAHs & QRA Events

| MAH                                                               | QRA Event | QRA Event Description                                       |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
| MAH-3<br>Jet Fire or Explosion from Swivel Stack                  | A11       | Swivel Area Release From First Stage Separator A Inlet Line |
|                                                                   | A12       | Swivel Area Release From First Stage Separator B Inlet Line |
|                                                                   | A32       | Swivel Area Gas Release from Export Gas Line                |
| MAH-5<br>Jet Fire or Explosion from Gas Treatment and Compression | A26       | Gas Release from HP Compressor/Suction Scrubber             |
|                                                                   | A28       | Gas Release from Fuel Gas System / Distribution             |
|                                                                   | A29       | Gas Release from Gas Scrubbers and TEG Contactor            |
|                                                                   | A49       | Gas Release from Export Gas Metering / Export Gas Cooler    |

- Equipment to QRA Event mapping obtained via Process & Implementation Diagrams (P&IDs) from the Fire & Explosion Analysis

# PoC Scope: PSPIs

| PSPI Type                                 | Green Threshold | Amber Threshold | Red Threshold |
|-------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|
| Anomalies - High Risk (Unmitigated)       | [Green Bar]     |                 |               |
| Anomalies - Medium Risk (Unmitigated)     | [Green Bar]     |                 |               |
| Firewater & Hydrocarbon Temporary Repairs | [Green Bar]     |                 |               |
| Long-Term Inhibits                        | [Green Bar]     |                 |               |
| ORAs                                      | 0               | 1               | 2             |
| PMA Backlog                               | [Green Bar]     |                 |               |
| PMA Deferrals                             | [Green Bar]     |                 |               |

- Risk criteria: tolerance levels ('thresholds') for the count of a particular type of PSPI e.g., the number of Preventative Maintenance Assurance (PMA) Backlog work orders.
- Defined at the SECE level
- Used to flag PSPIs (for a particular SECE) as low, medium, or high risk



# Power BI Dashboard

Demonstration

# Barrier Integrity



MAH

QRA Event



PSPI Type

All



All

All



## Process Containment





## Ignition Control





## Detection Systems



## Suppression Devices



## Protection Systems




← SECE 🔔

MAH MAH QRA Event QRA Event Equipment Category Equipment Category  
All All All

SECE  
SD006 Process ESDVs

| PSPI Type | Green Threshold | Amber Threshold | Red Threshold |
|-----------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|
| ORAs      | 0               | 1               | 2             |





## Operational Risk Assessments



MAH

QRA Event

Equipment Category

All


All

All

SECE   
SD006 Process ESDVs

ORA Level

ORA Residual Risk



| Affected Area / Module(s) | ORA Description | ORA Level | ORA Residual Risk | ORA Title | PSPI Instance ID | Start Date |
|---------------------------|-----------------|-----------|-------------------|-----------|------------------|------------|
|---------------------------|-----------------|-----------|-------------------|-----------|------------------|------------|

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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# Further Work


Scale Up & Integration with Digital Twin View

# Scale Up

- Mapping of SECEs to MAHs / from the AOC safety case has already been completed for a more comprehensive scope
- Pending AOC approval, can scale the enhanced barrier model to a larger portion of the FPSO



# Integrating with Digital Twin Views





# Poll Question

What do you think is the biggest challenge in developing a process safety hardware barrier model?


- a. Integrating data from existing systems
- b. Communicating the insight in a way that drives decision-making
- c. Quality/availability of data
- d. Training staff/adapting current PSPI review procedures to adopt a (new) Power BI tool
- e. Other- Please specify in the chat



Presented by: Roger Berriman


# Process Safety Leadership Training

“Is It all About Training?”



# Process Safety Training Impact

- The approach to raising awareness of major accident hazards and process safety management arrangements can vary considerably between industries for approach and effectiveness
- Organisational risk awareness, regulations, cultures and leadership values will all affect both the design and commitment to an effective training program
- The level of awareness (or competence) over time can vary considerably




# Process Safety (Training) Leadership

- Key purpose is to embed process safety leadership concepts, principles and behaviours.
- The program must bring Process Safety to life.
- A typical Empirisys program comprises the following elements:
  - **Executive & Site Leadership Team** –Process Safety Leadership workshop, supporting Leaders and managers to deliver a consistent message and understanding about Process Safety Leadership.
  - **Functional Support & Engineering Delivery Teams** –Process Safety Awareness workshop, supporting core functions to understand their role with respect to Process Safety
  - **Supervisors and Front-line Workers** –Process Safety Management fundamentals workshop, sharing key messages, language and toolkit (consistent message from control room to boardroom approach).
- The following slides set out a recommended approach

# Process Safety for Leaders

## Competency Assessment Life Cycle



# Executive Board & Site Leadership Team

## Outcomes:

- Objective is to ensure that all leaders and managers understand process safety with respect to their responsibilities, relevant legislation, facility hazards and industry relevant case study examples
- Understand why Major Accidents happen and the fundamentals of process safety management
- Creation of a common language and simple tool kit to ensure consistent management of Process Safety
- Introduction to Process Safety Leadership Principles, use of bowtie diagrams, management of safety critical barriers
- Owning Process Safety – your role as a Leader / Manager

## Delivery:

- Specialised training centre: e.g. DNV's Spadeadam, Research & Testing Facility in Cumbria to include demonstration of pool fire, vapour cloud explosion and jet fire(s)
- Local training centre: Inclusion of actors/role play to analyse major incidents

# Process Safety For Leaders Workshop (1)

## DNV Spadeadam Research & Testing Facility

RAF Spadeadam, Cumbria





# Process Safety For Leaders Workshop (2)




- Workshop facilitated by Empirisys supported by AKT Productions
- Process Safety Leadership failures at Piper Alpha ‘brought to life’ through theatre
- Leadership, culture and behaviour
- The role of leaders in organisational factor drift to failure





# Process Safety for Leaders

Competency Assessment Life Cycle



# Process Safety – Technical Competencies

- Delivery of Process Safety Technical Competencies
- Risk Management
- Asset Integrity
- Performance & Assurance
- Workshop Vs Computer Based Training
- Technical competency element training can be tailored to deliver either a 'proficient' or 'aware' level of understanding dependent on the Safety Critical Leadership roles



## Process Safety Leadership

An organisation with a mature approach to assuring process would normally operate at least the following systems


**Barrier Model**

**Interactive Process Safety KPI Dashboard**

- This information is supported by:
  - A suitable planning and resource allocation process
  - A hierarchical reporting process (OIM daily report to monthly Board report)
- These do not currently exist (at all or completely) in NEO Energy
- However, this is recognised and steps are in place to address this

# Process Safety for Leaders

Competency Assessment Life Cycle



# Process Safety – Leaders Toolkit

- Delivery of Process Safety Behavioural Competencies
- Storytelling
- Active listening
- Giving & receiving feedback
- Relationship between values, behaviour, culture & rules
- Visible Felt Leadership (role modelling)
- Process Safety Leadership as a Manager, Coach, Leader [How, When, Where, Who, How, Why]



**Coaching to Receive Feedback**

We behave differently in different situations

Be Open to feedback

Don't get defensive

It is not your fault

Listen to what is said

Check for understanding

Take notes

Focus on what is said

Say what you want

Coach

**Improve your verbal communication skills**

Use clear, concise language

Use active listening

Use open-ended questions

Use reflective listening

Use summarizing

Use coaching questions

Use coaching statements

Use coaching feedback

Use coaching encouragement

Use coaching support

Use coaching challenge

Use coaching reflection

Use coaching action

Use coaching evaluation

Use coaching review

Use coaching follow-up

**Coaching for Feedback**

Feedback in the workplace is extremely important. Organisations need effective communication to succeed and thrive. As well as increasing staff morale, feedback helps us learn more about ourselves as leaders (and coaches), our strengths and weaknesses, our behaviours, and how our actions affect others. It also increases our self-awareness and encourages personal development.

Ultimately, the desired outcome is to change another person's behaviour; timing, delivery, location and content are key to demonstrate your desire to support and encourage the change.

Feedback is not always positive i.e., where we reinforce a strong behaviour or technical application. Constructive or coaching feedback highlights areas where we need to improve. It is important that you give feedback competently and confidently, otherwise it provides no basis for development. i.e., poorly delivered feedback is worse than no feedback at all. Remember most feedback is a 'small touch on the rudder effect'; raising awareness, making observations etc

**Feedback is slightly towards the directive end of coaching, don't make the conversation a tell.**

The following details the key points to consider when delivering feedback: -


**Timing** – timing is key to delivering effective feedback and should ideally be delivered in the moment (i.e., 1st person observed feedback). If the opportunity is missed, then find the next soonest opportunity to deliver the feedback; provided weeks after the observations adds little value, the time delay is a missed opportunity for your observation to have become an emotional state to deliver this feedback (NOTE:- consider significant feedback may have to be scheduled or 1:1)

**Self** – for more significant items of feedback, consider your own emotional state to deliver this feedback (NOTE:- consider significant feedback may have to be scheduled or 1:1)

**Who** – feedback should be delivered to the person who is responsible for the behaviour if this is not possible, then deliver it to the person who is in a position to influence the behaviour



# How Impactful is Your Training? Considerations-



## Do Leaders & Managers:

- Understand why Major Accidents happen and the fundamentals of process safety management?
  - Understand process safety with respect to their responsibilities, relevant legislation, facility hazards?
  - Own and question process safety performance?
  - Have the required technical competencies for process safety?
  - Have the behavioural competencies to lead process safety?
- 
- Has the organization implemented a competency assessment lifecycle to maintain awareness over time?

Thank you




# Poll Question

How effective is your organisations process safety leadership training programme?

- a) We don't have one as its not relevant to our organisation
- b) We've run an awareness campaign for process safety and major accident avoidance but nothing else recently
- c) We've sent some of our leaders on a training course but there's been no follow on activity
- d) We train and assess our internal teams regularly on effective process safety leadership
- e) We have a process safety leadership competency programme which includes role based training, assessment and coaching for the technical & behavioural competencies we require

# Our Products



## SENSE

AI-enabled survey tool to create deep insight from structured & unstructured data using AI techniques (NLP/ LLM).



## BOOST



Create systemic insight into challenges to hardware and human barriers from HSE observations



## DETECT

Create early warning indicators into performance influencing factors from organisational data




# Our Services

## Consulting

- Bespoke data analytics for improving process safety
- AI solutions for automating processes
- Data insight from large industry datasets

## PS Leadership

- Board and SLT
- Technical & other leaders across asset lifecycle
- Front line workforce



Harness Your Data: Stay Safe, Profitable, and Ahead of Competition



# Take the Next Step!

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The logo for Empirisys, featuring the word "empirisys" in a white, lowercase, sans-serif font. Above the letter "i" is a white infinity symbol.



<https://calendly.com/nyala-empirisys/30min?month=2024-06>